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Abstract
Civil order is an important aspect of a healthy democratic society, however the right to
express dissatisfaction at the state of affairs is also important to a democracy. These two
points come into conflict when protests escalate out of control or turn into riots. Utilizing
a comparative case study methodology with a grounded theory framework, this study
seeks to understand how different police actions in protests can escalate the event into a
riot, what factors are present when this occurs, what are the situations which necessitate
that police make turning point choices, and what tools or concepts can police apply to
successfully navigate these situations in a community focused nonviolent or nonconfrontational way. By analyzing the cases of the 1999 WTO protests in Seattle and the
2014 Ferguson protests, themes indicating what actions escalate protests were extracted.
This research has suggested that police lack of preparedness, focus on order and control,
and lack of suitable internal and external communication contribute to protest escalation
and that implementation of a few training and preparation strategies may be effective in
mitigating the potential for escalation at the critical moments.
Keywords: protest, police, escalation, community, civil liberties
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Protest Escalation:
A Comparative Case Study Exploring Tools for Police for Successful Protest
Engagement
Chapter 1
Introduction
Civil order is an important aspect of a healthy democratic society, however the
right to express dissatisfaction at the state of affairs is also important to a democracy.
These two points come into conflict when protests escalate out of control or turn into
riots. In western style democracies there is a fine line that police are required to navigate
in order to maintain democratic ideals of protecting citizen rights and upholding public
order. However, there are times when police concern shifts towards a return to order and
protesters are dealt with by force. These are interactions which can lead to increased
violence and disorder, yet still leave the perception of power in the hands of the police.
While it is important that police maintain authority on a certain level, there should be
space for bringing issues to public attention without recourse to violence from police or
the public. Unfortunately in the context of contentious issues and confrontational
demonstrations, riots and violence are not uncommon outcomes. This outcome leaves
neither the police nor the protesters in a desirable state, the protesters lose their voice and
the police lose public confidence.
It has been emphasized that police play a role in escalating riots, but they are also
responsible for controlling them. Waddington (1987) posed that “the central dilemma for
the police is how to contain violent disorder whilst using only minimal force” (p. 46).
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The idea of mob sociology, wherein a crowd is seen as losing its individual rationale and
therefore being easily influenced and manipulated, is used to justify the escalated force
model, where the police objective is to quell disorder as quickly as possible. In this
model, First Amendment rights are ignored, there is a low tolerance for community
disruption or changes in status quo, nor is there much if any contact or communication
between police and protesters, aside from police infiltration. These standards facilitate
mass arrests, as well as the use of force in lieu of arrests for crowd dispersal
(Schweingruber, 2000). Nassauer (2015) highlighted five vital interactions for keeping
protests peaceful: that both police and protesters remain in their respective and agreed
upon spaces, the police maintain professionalism and internal communication, neither
police nor protesters show signs of aggressive behavior, an absence of property damage,
and the police and protesters have an understood and trusted flow of communication
about needs and intentions. Van de Klomp, Adang, and Van den Brink (2011) also
stressed the importance of properly nurtured community relations in contributing to the
success of repressive measures alongside relational measures in a riot situation. The
possibility of avoiding repressive measures through relational policing style of protests
should be examined to prevent escalation into a riot or other situation that might require
repressive action.
Statement of Problem
Protests are an almost constant occurrence in the United States and around the
world, generally designed to create a type of disturbance or at least disruption of the day
to day ordinary routine in order to draw attention and consideration to some issue. In the
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United States many forms of protest are protected under the First Amendment protection
of free speech, which is designed to protect citizens and the media from censorship when
speaking out against problems with the government, such as corruption or other
unconstitutional behavior (US Dept. of Justice, Global Justice Information Sharing
Initiative, & United States of America, 2011). Therefore government intervention in
protest has to be carefully considered. However, in view of the purposes and strategies of
protests, i.e. disruption and disturbance, it falls to the governmental entities of law
enforcement agencies, police, to bear the responsibility of maintaining the safety of the
public, as well as that of the constitutionally protected protesters.
The problems begin when the purposes of the police and the protesters conflict,
which while there is no comprehensive certified list of U.S. protests, occurs frequently
enough to stimulate public discomfort with police engagement in protest. Police make an
effort to create a controlled environment within which protests can occur in an orderly
manner, thus ensuring safety is maintained and police duty is fulfilled. Unfortunately
there are numerous cases around the United States where these carefully laid plans fail to
account for some of the unpredictable eventualities of protests, and sometimes protests
deliberately oppose these plans because they are antithetical to the aims of the protest.
When this occurs the backlash is significant. Protesters, the police, and the public become
endangered as the police and protesters fight to achieve competing goals. The aftermath
of these events tends to result in public outcry, frequently directed toward police
mismanagement of the protest.
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Policing of protests is not something new to law enforcement agencies, but
neither is the eventuality of an escalating protest. Law enforcement agencies share best
practices across cities, counties, and states, describing what did and did not work in
various experiences in order to help each agency be better prepared and each event to be
better managed. With the wealth of experience and institutional knowledge behind protest
policing, how do some of these events escalate in such disastrous ways? There are all
kinds of protests that go un-notably smoothly, but what are the commonalities between
the numbers of protests which do escalate in dangerous and unanticipated ways?
Existing research suggests that communication, and its connection to police
relationship with the communities concerned, plays an important role in the perception
and reception of police involvement and interventions during protests. There is
substantially less research which examines critical tipping points which spur changes in
police tactics, and conversely protester responses to police actions. This study seeks to
begin to fill that gap through comparison of two protest events which escalated into riots;
one being the Seattle, WA protest in 1999 of the World Trade Organization conference
(WTO) and the Ferguson, MO protest in 2014 of the fatal shooting of Michael Brown, a
black teen, by white police officer Darren Wilson. This comparative case study utilizing
grounded theory will work to establish what common pivotal moments and occurrences
lead to the escalation of these protest and create a checklist of steps to mediate those
moments.
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Background
The WTO conference was set to be held in the U.S. in 1999, and Seattle made its
bid to be the host city. By the end of January 1999 Seattle had been selected to host this
international conference. From this point forward preparations began. A committee was
established between city organizations and major local corporations to handle the
organizational aspects of the conference. The Seattle Police Department was placed in
charge of organizing the conference security. It was made clear on multiple occasions
that responsibility for security was in the hands of local law enforcement and neither the
federal government nor the WTO administrators would provide logistical or financial
support (Seattle Police Department, 2000). The Seattle Police Department took on this
responsibility relying on their past experience with large events such as the Goodwill
Games in 1990 and the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation conference in 1993. The
SPD (2000) expected that the WTO conference would be less considerable than the two
cited experiences, because unlike those events, the WTO conference did not anticipate
participation of any heads of state.
The SPD planning for the conference was extensive, spanning from the end of
January 1999 until the start of the conference at the end of November the same year.
However, it failed to adequately prepare the agencies involved for the scope of the
protests that occurred. The SPD contacted neighboring police agencies to request support,
as well as the Washington National Guard to be on standby for the event. These other
agencies were not deeply involved in the planning process beyond the request for
support. The majority of the planning around the expected protests was to meet with
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protest organizers to establish safe demonstration and procession details. Demonstration
management aspects were related to goals of conference security, escort of delegates and
dignitaries, and traffic management (SPD, 2000). With the unanticipated scope of the
protest, compared to the demonstration management preparations, safe escort of delegates
was hindered along with the other goals.
When the WTO conference was scheduled to begin on November 30, the protest
blockaded transport of delegates, effectively foiling the conference opening ceremonies.
This occurrence demonstrated the obstruction of all of the SPD’s security goals. To move
forward the SPD began using primarily chemical irritants, such as pepper spray and tear
gas, along with methods of less lethal force, such as rubber bullets and batons, to move
protesters out of direct contact with the conference site. Protests persisted, and the SPD
continued using the same methods to move them constantly away from the conference
site. This went on through the length of the conference and protesters were not permitted
to return to the area of the conference until the final day of the conference on December
3rd. Throughout that time, small blocks of destructive and criminal activity occurred
within the larger protests. These criminal components were not addressed individually,
the SPD was unable to make targeted arrests and instead continued to rely on moving the
entire protest away from the conference. The arrival of the Washington National Guard
provided the SPD and other cooperating agencies with some relief, allowing for the deescalation of the event coinciding with the end of the conference.
In Ferguson there was no planning for an organized event and anticipated protest,
and many of the established Ferguson Police Department practices played a role in the
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events from August 9th to August 25th 2014. On August 9th an encounter between Michael
Brown, a black teen, and the FPD led to his fatal shooting by Officer Darren Wilson.
Community presence and the FPD procedures following this shooting grew into large
scale demonstrations protesting FPD treatment of the community’s black residents and
seeking police accountability.
Prior to these events the Ferguson Police Department had a poor history with the
black community in Ferguson. Many of the standard practices in Ferguson were focused
on revenue generation, therefore, public safety and restoration were not a priority (The
U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, 2015). City code and statute violations
were issued in vast quantities and the court process for addressing the incurred fines was
difficult and unaccommodating, leading to more and more fines without concern for
resolution of the violation. The U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division (2015)
documented extensive use of overly vague statutes, such as failure to comply and
resisting arrest, as provocations to the use of force. These practices resulted in distrust
and resentment among the effected community. The lack of community focus from the
FPD delegitimized their position creating an environment where the community was less
interested in cooperating with law enforcement efforts. This de-legitimization in the
perspective of the community was reflected in the protest response to Michael Brown’s
shooting and the police handling of that scene.
Local residents began to gather immediately after Michael Brown was shot at
noon on August 9th, this crowd grew and eventually developed into demonstrators and
protest after the crime scene investigation ended that evening. As the crowd grew, the
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police presence grew in response. The intention was to secure the scene for the ongoing
investigation, however, the community perception was of police intimidation, as canines
and armored vehicles were brought to the scene (Institute for Intergovernmental
Research, 2015). Throughout the investigation of the scene the FPD did not communicate
with the gathered community about what was happening with the investigation, leaving
the community to speculate.
Once the FPD finished and cleared the scene, it was expected that the crowd
would also dissipate, but after holding a vigil the crowd remained and began protesting in
earnest the following day. The FPD responded in the same way they had at the scene of
the shooting, using a militarized response, increasing police presence, with canines, riot
gear, and armored vehicles. As night came, destruction arose and the FPD were not
prepared to make the number of targeted arrest that would have been necessary to prevent
continued destructive and criminal activity. The FPD requested assistance from
neighboring police agencies and continued with the militarized response. This approach
was adjusted when the incident command was reassigned to Captain Ronald S. Johnson
of the State Highway Patrol, who attempted to decrease the militarized presence and
implement a relational approach. This change in approach brought a temporary relief to
the escalation of the incident, however tensions returned with FPD presentation of
security footage suggesting Michael Brown had committed robbery prior to the shooting.
The decreased militarized presence and the relational approach persevered, and by
August 25th, with a request from Michael Brown’s family the incident was able to
deescalate.
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Rationale
Through a critical comparison of the two cases described above, this study is
meant to illuminate the ways that protests escalate and how police agencies can better
approach them. As was previously noted, protest is an integral aspect of U.S. democracy
and society, protests will remain a prevalent occurrence in the voicing of discontent and
values. If police are intended to be involved in the management of protests, it is critically
important that they are provided with resources to follow that mandate through without
compromising human and civil rights. This research is meant to support that endeavor by
generating a better understanding of what leads to problems and escalation and
subsequently what resources police agencies need to better address protests.
While this study focusses on two cases of U.S. protests, the need for this research
is applicable to other Western style democracies as well. Police involvement in managing
protests is not unique to the U.S., but there are varying approaches used internationally
just as there are across the United States. Everywhere that police encounter protest with
any kind of expectation of freedom of expression, there is that precarious balance to be
made in protecting those expected rights and protecting public safety and order. This
research can be used as groundwork to analyze protest response practices in other
Western style democracies just as effectively as it can be used in the United States. For
example, as a researcher, I saw that the police struggle with persistent protests and riots
in Northern Ireland in the context of historic cultural and political divides. The shape of
these protests and riots has remained ostensibly the same for decades. Though there are
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different cultural contexts shaping events in Northern Ireland, this research could serve as
a relevant launch point for examining the police role in those contexts.
Beyond the scope of Western style democracies, this research may not be
impactful to internal efforts to address protests, as other styles of governing may not
place the same value on freedom of expression or take the same approach to police
responsibilities. However, it may be applicable to approaches of external influences
working within these bodies. In some countries, expression of negative views of power
systems is illegal and gravely punished. This does not necessarily prevent protests from
occurring. In my studies I found this to be the case in Thailand, where there are steep
prison sentences for anyone expressing disparaging views of the King. In countries with
this type of perspective on expression, protest is discouraged. Therefore, when it does
occur it is not addressed with consideration for civil rights. In the international
development field there are people and organizations that make an effort to observe
human rights violations in these types of situations. The U.S. is often viewed as a check
and upholder of human rights across the globe. With this perspective, it is pertinent that
understanding internally how to find the balance of public safety and order with human
and civil rights will provide insight, or at minimum, one step in how to address the same
concept as a development actor in a country that does not necessarily hold the same
values.
Research Questions
Utilizing a comparative case study methodology with a grounded theory
framework, this study seeks to understand how different police actions in protests can
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escalate the event into a riot, what factors are present when this occurs, what are the
situations which necessitate that police make turning point choices, and what tools or
concepts can police apply to successfully navigate these situations in a community
focused nonviolent or non-confrontational way. The propositions which are guiding this
study, based on the literature include; escalation occurs when police and protesters do not
maintain continuous and open communication (Nassauer, 2015), escalation occurs when
the police have a poor relationship with the community and norms and standards differ
between them (Gillham & Marx, 2000, & Waddington & King, 2005), and escalation
occurs when police and protesters view each other as obstacles to their objectives
(Reicher et al., 2004). These propositions come from the theories developed in past
researcher and literature, which this study is building on and contributing to, they guide
this study in the sense that they are the preexisting perspectives regarding protest
escalation.
Definition of Terms
Escalation: The change in dynamics and atmosphere of an event moving upward on a
scale from peaceful and uneventful, to destruction and disorder, to unimpeded violence
and rioting, and all intermediary iterations.
Civil liberties: The rights of citizens and residents, extending from basic human rights to
constitutionally ensured rights.
Incident response: The cooperating agencies and actions which are involved in
managing a protest or escalating event.
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Turning point: Moments in protests where actions, taken or not taken, move the
situation onto a trajectory of continued escalation, particularly when possibly a more
calculated action could have moved the situation in the opposite direction.
Strategic objectives: Specific approaches to an event intended to achieve specific goals
and outcomes.
Tactics: Specific actions implemented in an event.
Chemical irritants: The array of chemical based tools such as pepper spray and tear gas
used by agencies generally to disperse non-compliant crowds, rioters, or combative
individuals.
Militarization: The use of military style approaches, such as tanks, armored vehicles,
sniper style surveillance, or combat and riot gear.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
Predicting the escalation of a riot is an often studied subject. Researchers have
examined theories of geographical and racial implications in the spread of riots, as in
Myers (2000) study of diffusion of collective violence, as well as what features of
protests are most likely to illicit police attention (Earl, Soule, & McCarthy, 2003). From
the starting point of protests, Nassauer (2015) identified five vital police to crowd
interactions necessary to keeping protests peaceful. Though Nassauer’s study was very
recent, similar ideas about police role in the escalation of protests had been introduced by
Waddington (1987) almost 20 years prior. While protests are a fairly structured
framework for examining the eruption of riots, not all riots begin from an organized
gathering of that nature. Frequently violent riots burst out of mounting community
tension due to economic or cultural oppression (Chuchouisuwan, Chantachon, &
Rodhetphai, 2011). In situations like this King (2004) and Murphy, Sargeant, and
Cherney (2015) indicated the importance of community confidence in the police for the
de-escalation of riot situations. Despite the abundance of compounding evidence and
research which emphasize de-escalation recommendations, the same problems continue
to arise in the practice of policing civil disorder which allow for the escalation of riot
situations.
There is always some form of impetus for the onset of a riot. Some event shifts a
group of people into a seemingly cohesive violent mentality. While this shift tends to
appear as a sudden explosion, it is the result of tensions growing and impacting over
time, until a situation bringing indignation arises which creates the perception of violence
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as a legitimate reaction, and presents the opportunity for solidarization through violence
(Van de Klomp, Adang, & Van den Brink 2011). In the case of the 1999 Woodstock riot,
bystanders were unaware of the growing discontent of the concert-goers who were
catalyzed into rioting by the underwhelming and overhyped finale of the festival (Vider,
2004). Even though the participants cited many different reasons for taking part in the
riot, the fact of prior mounting frustration throughout the festival was apparent. Vider
(2004) used this case to illustrate that while the rioters act as a group, the motives which
they act upon “may be less unified than the rioters themselves believe” (p. 149).
Diversified motives can cause concern in addressing riot situations which are generally
approached as a cohesive mob, however given the understanding of growing group
tensions leading into the riot situation, there is still an avenue for a cohesive approach.
Many of the tactics actually employed are not as effective as they could be in a
long term perspective of maintaining public order. One strategy that is still in use in some
places is the escalated force approach. This tactic comes from a perspective of mob
sociology, which frames protesters or a gathering of the public as unorganized leaderless
crowds falling into riot behavior by agitator influence. Schweingruber (2000) described
how this agitation can come from internal individual influence within the crowd, or by
external influence by unjustified action from the police or an other, or even by exposure
of police weakness. “The strategies that police adopt toward these demonstrators depend
not primarily on the demonstrators “objective” actions or attributes but on the socially
constructed images of the demonstrators and predictions about their behavior”
(Schweingruber, 2000, p. 372). The idea of mob sociology is used to justify the escalated
force model, where the police objective is to quell disorder as quickly as possible. In this
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model, First Amendment rights are ignored, there is a low tolerance for community
disruption or changes in status quo, nor is there much if any contact or communication
between police and protesters, aside from police infiltration. These standards facilitate
mass arrests, as well as the use of force in lieu of arrests for crowd dispersal
(Schweingruber, 2000). This also aligns with the riot curve theory which describes a riot
as beginning from a state of normal policing, to high tension, which leads to pre-riot
stage, progressing to the apex of the riot, then falling to the post-riot stage, and back to a
state of normal policing (King, 2004). In these models of crowd behavior an escalated
force approach to policing addresses the main concern of return to order. However,
Schweingruber (2000) suggested that as a result of this perspective of the inevitability of
the progression of the riot stages “police often provoked the expected violence and
“proved” the “reality” of the images” (p. 372). This approach to crowd and riot policing
may appear effective in accomplishing the desired outcome, but that may simply be
because it perpetuates the framework which provides its justification.
When police have been determined a necessary presence at a protest or
demonstration there are certain interactions and signs which can escalate the situation
toward rioting. Nassauer (2015) described signs, such as, protesters beginning to don face
masks, as indicating to police that violence is imminent, while police suiting into riot gear
indicates the same to the crowd. Dependent on the type of demonstration, police may be
in riot gear from the very start, generating a higher tension atmosphere with a greater
likelihood of rioting. Though this practice is intended to result in a more timely response
to violence, Perez (2003) would “argue that certain applications of high levels of direct
repression will not only be ineffective in quelling a riot but may in fact be escalatory,
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worsening an already volatile situation” (p. 155). This type of result is likely when police
repression is excessive or selective, which it can appear to be when a seemingly peaceful
demonstration is met with officers in full riot gear, when the police have poor training in
crowd control, or when police to community relations are strained or lacking in formal
channels for feedback (Perez, 2003). Again in the escalated force approach, there are no
formal channels of communication between the police and the crowd, and the police
focus on forceful dispersion without regard to First Amendment rights. As King (2004)
illustrated the concern that “crowd control tactics will not succeed without the necessary
legitimation, support, and involvement of the local community. Such conditions are
unlikely to be achieved wherever senior officers interpret community activities according
to a “criminal” frame of reference” (p. 135). However, some newer protest policing
approaches theoretically address these issues.
Police practices which emphasize trust and confidence can promote the sustaining
of peaceful protests and demonstrations. The negotiated management strategy of protest
policing can accommodate the factors which promote peaceful demonstrations, as it is
based on respect for First Amendment rights. Nassauer (2015) highlighted “five vital
interactions for keeping protests peaceful: respect for territorial boundaries, good police
management, absence of escalation signs, absence of property damage, and well-working
communication between protesters and police” (p. 7). This means that both police and
protesters remain in their respective and agreed upon spaces, the police maintain
professionalism and internal communication, neither police nor protesters show signs of
aggressive behavior, and the police and protesters have an understood and trusted flow of
communication about needs and intentions. According to Nassauer’s (2015) study

PROTEST ESCALATION

21

findings, these factors can certify a peaceful demonstration. The negotiated management
strategy is for the most part in accordance with these factors. Negotiated management
starts with respect for First Amendment rights, permits a high tolerance for community
disruption, in terms of redirected traffic and large gatherings, promotes open and frank
communication between police and demonstrators, and avoids arrests and the use of
force. However, in practice this strategy has not always been as limited in force as
suggested, and many areas where it had been adopted reverted back to mob sociology and
escalated force approaches due to a negative feedback loop (Schweingruber, 2000).
It can be expected that a relational approach like negotiated management would
be less favorable when considering the vulnerability it creates if poorly managed.
Waddington (1987) described the “fear, anxiety, anger, and frustration amongst officers”
(p. 40) when policing a disorderly crowd from close quarters. Van de Klomp, Adang, and
Van den Brink (2011) stressed the importance of properly nurtured community relations
in contributing to the success of repressive measures alongside relational measures in a
riot situation. While Murphy, Sargeant, and Cherney (2015) determined that most people
were more willing to cooperate with police when they felt they were treated with respect,
fairness, and neutrality. The perception of the police as effective in their duties also
contributed to public cooperation. This places the police in a peculiar situation, as police
tend to receive harsh criticism if they fail to foresee escalation toward a riot and fail to
take pre-emptive action. Therefore the imperative “is to “do everything one can” in the
circumstances, which in the context of policing civil disorder, means intervening as
forcefully as necessary, within the limits of the forces capability, to restore order.
Therefore, this amounts to bias against restraint” (Waddington, 1987, p. 43). At the same
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time restraint has been implicated as a key factor in respecting and gaining cooperation
and control of a crowd or community.
In case studies of successfully managed riots, respect was demonstrated as an
important factor to the return to order. Hoopes (2002) analyzed the management of a riot
over benefits for the unemployed by Chester Barnard in 1935. This situation showed the
signs of growing tensions, which finally erupted into a riot when police aggressively
confronted protesters. Chester Barnard met with representatives of the protest and,
through communication showing respect and recognition of dignity, managed to
negotiate a cooperative agreement (Hoopes, 2002). Similarly a case study of riots based
in religious cultural tensions in Thailand were addressed using a peaceful cultural model.
It was concluded that due to the layers of causal tensions, to solve the riot problem “must
need understanding of basic, needs, collective consciousness and collective cause of most
local people; including respecting liberty and cultural identity of one another”
(Chuchouisuwan, Chantachon, & Rodhetphai, 2011, p. 158). These examples, while
successful, are of management outside of the policing stage. Yet it is the “consistent
failures by police to confront protests in an even-handed and impartial manner [which]
bare much of the responsibility for the riots” (Perez, 2003).
It has been emphasized that police play a role in escalating riots, but they also are
those responsible for controlling them. Waddington (1987) posed that “the central
dilemma for the police is how to contain violent disorder whilst using only minimal
force” (p. 46). This is not an easy task when police have to approach confrontational
protest styles (Earl, Soule, & McCarthy, 2003). The aggression from the anxiety of the
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situation becomes an unfortunate influence. Nassauer (2015) hoped to address even this
aspect of fear in protest policing, suggesting that “police training and professionalism can
maximize well-working management and organization and decrease the likelihood of the
perception of danger” (p. 12). Waddington (1987) also suggested the fact of well
protected officers, through effective riot gear, have less incentive for taking over-reactive
pre-emptive action out of fear of being injured. While both these ideas have benefits the
first requires extensive training and reshaping of protest management strategies, and the
second brings in a sign of escalation.
In the case of the World Trade Organization (WTO) protest in Seattle in 1999,
these points were not fully addressed, but there may have been more contributing factors
anyway. While communication occurred prior to the protest in a strategies negotiation
between protest organizers and police there was no form of ongoing communication
throughout the event (Gillham & Marx, 2000). In fact both sides were employing secrecy
tactics. The protesters were not sharing specifics about their actions between groups
within the protest, in order to avoid leaking information to the police that would allow the
police to prevent or impede the actions. On the other side the police did not want
protesters to know their tactics so that they could be prepared in a way to nullify their
purposes (Gillham & Marx, 2000). While the strategic points can be understood from
both perspectives, the result was anger and frustration in both parties. Particularly
because neither side seemed to be following the strategies agreed upon prior to the protest
(Gillham & Marx, 2000). How could either side stick to their original strategy if the other
side was not following the script either? One of the issues is that a script can only be
followed in a vacuum. There were too many unknowns in the actual event for either side
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to stick entirely to the agreed upon plan. As a result, both sides felt betrayed and angry,
leading the situation to escalate (Gillham & Marx, 2000).
It is unlikely, however, that the situation would have proceeded as planned even
absent the unexpected variables of the actual event. This can be inferred from the practice
of secrecy within both groups. Had both parties intended to follow the strategies agreed
upon in the negotiation, then there would have been no need for secrecy, as all plans were
already shared and known. Unfortunately there is a lack of trust and understanding
between the parties creating an expectation of betrayal and therefore a sense of
entitlement to not follow the agreement. In this situation the police were unprepared in
terms of staff to have the capacity to follow through with the agreed upon tactic of mass
arrests (Gillham &Marx, 2000; & Herbert, 2007). The police had been assured of
“scripted civil disobedience” (Gillham & Marx, 2000, p. 218) which would result in
arrest, but were unprepared for events to actually proceed that way.
In response to vandalism and in efforts to maintain order and control, without the
man power for mass arrests, police began using non-lethal crowd dispersal tactics. This
included tear-gas and concussion grenades (Gillham & Marx, 2000). However, just as the
police seemed to not expect the protesters to follow the agreed upon script, the protesters
also expected the police to detour from the agreement. The negotiations established that
police would not be using chemical irritants and similar non-lethal dispersal weapons, yet
the protesters had prepared themselves with gas masks and vinegar soaked bandanas to
protect themselves from precisely these types of tactics (Gillham & Marx, 2000). As a
result these tactics were largely ineffective in achieving police objectives. Protesters were
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protected and mostly unhindered by the gas, while unintended targets, such as shoppers,
WTO delegates, and city officials were affected (Gillham & Marx, 2000). Instead of
dispersing the protesters these tactics fueled protester distrust, anger, and sense of
betrayal, escalating the aggression of the crowd and strengthening protester resolve
against police.
After the first day of protests proceeded much differently from the agreement, the
city passed an emergency zoning ordinance to effectively ban protest in the downtown
area where the WTO event was taking place (Herbert, 2007). The protesters didn’t see
this as a legitimate action, because they had gained approval for that location in the prior
negotiations and had already occupied the space from the first day of the protest (Gillham
& Marx, 2000). The protesters treated the ordinance with an attitude of “no take backs”
and continued to occupy the applicable zone. Police found these actions to be a challenge
to their authority and control (Gillham & Marx, 2000; & Herbert, 2007). After tear gas
had proven less effective than anticipated, police also utilized rubber bullets and
concussion grenades to move protesters to more desirable locations in the Capitol Hill
neighborhood where they could more easily control the crowd out of the way of business
and commuters. From this point the situation again escalated, with increased aggression
and disorder (Gillham & Marx, 2000).
Considering the lack of follow through in the agreed upon strategies, which
resulted in escalation of aggression and disorder on both sides, it seems that one of the
root causes was a lack of trust. Noakes and Gillham (2007) studied how the Seattle WTO
incident influenced police and protester interactions since 1999 and noted that police
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often have difficulty in getting past stereotypes of protesters. This seems evident based on
the case of WTO protest in Seattle, that police had a certain expectation of the protesters
despite what was communicated during negotiations prior to the protest. But this is not
simply an issue that the police have. Protesters hold certain beliefs about police that are
difficult to move beyond. Noakes and Gillham (2007) noted that “despite efforts made to
understand the other side, tensions remained around the respective constructions of
concepts such as provocation and dialogue” (p. 337). If the protesters are not seen to be
cooperating in a way compatible with police expectations, the police are also less likely
to follow negotiated management tactics and will utilize other tactics to exert control
(Noakes & Gillham, 2007). On the other hand, protesters if feeling overly controlled are
more likely to see the police as an illegitimate force and will be far less inclined to
comply (Herbert, 2007).
It is possible that regardless of the amount and depth of communication, police
and protesters would be unable to develop understanding or reach a mutually beneficial
consensus or compromise. It is possible that frequently the police and the protesters have
entirely opposing aims, which are incompatible at their core levels. In the case of the
Seattle WTO protest, the authority of the police may have been seen by some as a part of
the larger problem of unquestioned power and capitalism represented by the WTO
(Gillham & Marx, 2000). With this mindset, it is unlikely that protesters would have ever
felt truly inclined to comply with police, regardless of tactics. Police tend to aim to
maintain control and order, but that is a goal that protesters are also unable to support as
they generally rely on disruption to spread awareness for their cause (Reicher, 2004).
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In some situations police will attempt to illicit self-policing within the groups of
protesters, in hopes that they will discourage more serious infractions of their own
members. One tactic for this is by letting smaller infractions go unpunished. Sometimes
this tactic will simply result in a new standard of behavior where the smaller infractions
are the norm and the bigger infractions seem less serious (Gillham & Marx, 2000). This
result follows the same logic that Waddington and King (2005) described where crowds
develop norms as they form, in a normative structure. In this way standards are set from
the start, which police can influence by their own actions and reactions.
The opposition in goals and to each other makes protests difficult situations to
handle, but there are suggestions and tactics that logically address many of the issues that
seem to result in escalation. Reicher, Stott, Cronin, and Adang (2004) presented a
different perspective on crowd behavior, emphasizing the “shift from individual identity
to social identity” (p. 562). This perspective is important because it explains crowd
behavior more rationally than the now rejected mob mentality perspective. Where mob
mentality showed crowds to be dangerous, volatile, and highly susceptible to negative
and violent suggestion, social identity explains that the crowd behavior is based on the
values of the crowds shared identity. Depending on the situation this identity could be
any number of things, in the case of protests it is frequently based around a common
ideal, such as the environment, labor rights, or anti-capitalism. If the police can
understand these shared values and identity they can better understand the crowd
behavior (Reicher et al., 2004).
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This perspective also explains why forceful interventions can escalate situations.
When group members see other members attacked it is felt as an attack against the group
identity and the group will act to defend that collective identity by attacking out groups,
which tend to be the police in protest situations (Reicher et al., 2004). In the case of the
WTO protest in Seattle, there was the Black Bloc anarchist group, who frequently are the
first to enact and incite aggressive behavior and vandalism, the group “agreed not to
engage in ‘property transformation’ unless police engaged in violence first” (Gillham &
Marx, 2000, p. 217). If police were seen to deal aggressively with this group without the
rest of the crowd understanding the motivation or that it was a faction that did not
necessarily share the same collective identity, they would see it as an attack against the
group. Reicher et al. (2004) suggested that police adopt an integrative approach, whereby
they join the crowd and communicate on the ground in real time with the protesters. By
doing this the protesters would have a closer perspective on police actions and be present
to the decisions to take actions against members acting outside of the groups values. With
this closer perspective the group is more likely to take on the role of sanctioning
aggressive members themselves, reducing the amount of interference needed from the
police (Reicher et al., 2004).
An interactive integrative approach by police promotes ongoing communication
with protesters, which promotes trust and understanding between the parties. Though as
noted previously sometimes no amount of communication can create true understanding.
However, Reicher et al. (2004) described two conditions which influence crowds to selfsanction; one being that they view the acts of some as illegitimate to the collective values
and standards, or two that these members act in a way which impedes the crowd in
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accomplishing goals considered legitimate to the collective values and standards. If the
police can interact in a way that they come to understand these values they can work to
encourage and not interfere with self-sanctioning. They can also be present enough to
step in when self-sanctions are inadequate and the crowd has accepted that certain
members are acting outside of the collective values. This does not entirely prevent
violence, but it helps to slow and prevent escalation as police and protesters are more able
to distinguish between isolated groups and the overall crowd (Reicher et al., 2004).
One of the failings of the WTO protests in Seattle and many protest situations that
do not seem to go according to plan, is that police act in general terms toward the entire
protest in reaction to what could, with a different response, be an isolated anomaly.
Reicher et al. (2004) described “where police treat all crowd members the same, they are
likely to see themselves as all the same” (p. 568). In this sense, if the police react to the
Black Bloc actions, in the WTO case, by increasing force across the board, then
protesters who would otherwise not identify with the values of the Black Bloc suddenly
find themselves recognizing unity with that group. Generalized forceful interventions
alienate protesters with legitimate aims from the police, even if the true goal of the police
is only to prevent spread of the illegitimate actions. The response can have the entirely
opposite effect from the intention.
One of the patterns that is appearing is the effort to maintain control and authority
by police in protest situations. However, control also appears to be where much of the
conflict arises. Reicher et al. (2004) noted that “as things stand police officers
predominantly view crowds as a problem and seek to control them, while crowd members
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see police officers as a problem and feel controlled by them” (p. 577). The problem
comes from a desire to control and a desire to be allowed to accomplish certain goals, or
not be controlled. The interesting part is that neither party’s end goal is to possess
control. Generally the protesters want to make their message heard and for that message
to have impact. Generally police want an event to run safely and without violence or
damage and destruction. Somehow both parties get trapped in the idea that controlling the
situation, or having complete free rein, is what will allow them to accomplish these goals.
When either party finds themselves losing the edge on this front they increase their grip
and strain vehemently to keep it. Gillham and Marx (2000) and Herbert (2007) noticed
that when police found their authority challenged was when they increased control
efforts. This creates a tug-of-war situation, where if either side gives, even just a little bit,
they will potentially lose everything. Therefore the situation continually escalates.
In working to keep a crowd or protest from veering off target and into violent or
destructive territory, police can take preemptive action. This might sound like the police
should be more aggressive earlier to discourage violence, but instead they should be
making efforts from the start of, and prior to, the event to ensure the crowd can achieve
their goals. In the case of the WTO protest, the pre-protest negotiations were meant to do
this, but the focus was on actions and tactics, what each party agreed to do or not do,
rather than what each party hoped to achieve (Gillham & Marx, 2000). Reicher et al.
(2004) suggested that police take an integrative approach, in which they continually
communicate with protesters to understand their goals and how the police can assist in
reaching those goals. Specifically, switching the police perspective from; “how can we
frustrate them” to “how can we facilitate them” (Reicher et al., 2004, p. 572).

PROTEST ESCALATION

31

Moving into a position of facilitation requires concerted effort. Police need to first
educate themselves about the social identity associated with the protest (Reicher et al.,
2004). Using this knowledge they can develop a better understanding of the group’s
values and standards to enable them to better communicate with the group to understand
their needs and goals. Communication should seek to promote trust and facilitation, this
can be enabled through finding a trusted and respected group member to initiate
communication with (Reicher et al., 2004). If the police can understand the values and
goals of the group, then they will be better prepared to help solve problems which impede
those goals, giving them the ability to actually facilitate the group in accomplishing their
aims. In this way the police will be able to gradually build actual trust within the group.
This trust is integral if and when police action or forceful intervention becomes necessary
(Reicher et al., 2004).
If violence occurs in a protest group in which the police have integrated
themselves and established themselves as actively working to help achieve the group
goals, they are more likely to be seen as group insiders. When the crowd finds themselves
facing frustration and aggression they need a scapegoat and generally the police are the
most obvious outsider to take on that role (Waddington & King, 2005). But if the police
have managed to integrate sincerely in the group, then protesters who are breaking away
from the values of the greater group identity will be seen as the outsiders and the crowd
will be more understanding if the police need to take action to intervene in whatever
behavior is disrupting the group aims. To do this however, the police have to clearly
differentiate between groups in the crowd (Reicher et al., 2004). Reicher et al., (2004)
pointed to this as the most important when signs of violence first arise, if they hope to
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keep violence isolated. The police must be seen to understand that the actions of one
group is not necessarily reflective of the entire group, so that the entire group can see that
their goals and aims are not being impeded by the police or the violent factions.
With the current perspective in protests of police trying to control protesters and
protesters fighting against police, it is nearly impossible for the parties not to conflict and
create an escalating situation. However, if a new approach can emerge as suggested by
Reicher et al. (2004), in which the two groups work together in an effort to promote the
goals of the other party, then they can work in harmony. The police will need to take an
approach of working for the protesters, and use the image that they are present to protect
and serve that population. If this can become a standard then the protesters will
appreciate the police presence and collaborate to make that job easier instead of harder.
For this to happen police need to develop a presence that sincerely demonstrates a
community service approach. Miller, Toliver, and Schanzer (2012) described how police
that are engaged in their community demonstrate genuine interest in understanding the
community. As the community sees this becoming actual standard practice, that sincerity
will become a positive reputation which, will support the police in their other efforts with
protests or disturbances. This process does take time, and police will need to put the
honest effort into “understanding sources of mistrust of the police in different
communities and work to address them” (Miller et al., 2012, p. 27). Part of this effort is
focus on transparency. The secrecy that marked the WTO protests can only engender
more distrust. Police need to “make it clear that they are working in service to that
community” (Miller et al., 2012, p. 33). If police have nothing to hide, then they will
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build trust easily, if they remain transparent about their intentions and goals (Miller et al.,
2012). On similar trust building lines, the community will come to believe in police
intentions if they take on the practice of asking, listening, and delivering (Miller et al.,
2012). With this tactic the community will see the police making the effort to truly
understand the community needs and if they deliver on those lines, the community will
see the sincerity.
This trust building is not a short term project, but if police choose to look at larger
scale goals, beyond control and contain, this is a necessary process. However, Reicher et
al. (2004) noted that the “negative costs of trust are more likely to be borne by the front
line officer, which make them less willing to implement such strategy even if directed by
a commanding officer” (p. 575). But it is these very same front line officers that are the
integral piece to developing community trust. Reicher et al. (2012) suggested that these
issues “need to be addressed through training and operational procedures” (p. 575). While
Miller et al. (2012) recommended addressing burnout prevention with appropriate
staffing levels. This suggests that training in community engagement needs to be
widespread throughout the police department to ensure as many officers as possible are
prepared to engage in a trust building approach.
If police are able to treat a protest as a community and support it in reaching its
goals then they may create a naturally safe environment. Miller et al. (2012) described
that “community members who feel a sense of belonging to the community as a larger
whole are more invested in keeping their community safe” (p. 6). This is a concept which
ties back into the role of self-policing in protests. If the police communicate to
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understand and support the social identity, or community, of the protest they can help to
make that community feel responsible and accountable for itself in a way which diverts
trouble to avoid violence. If police can discover the needs through asking and listening,
they can present their resources and capacity to help reach those goals, making
themselves a community asset as opposed to an impediment. As an asset, the police are
more likely to be supported in their efforts as well. Reicher et al. (2004) described how
the protest approach needs to change from one where “police officers predominantly
view crowds as a problem and seek to control them… [to one where] police officers
consider crowds as an opportunity and seek to enable them” (p. 577).
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Chapter 3
Methods
This study utilized a comparative case study of two U.S. protests, endeavoring to
illuminate the phenomena of protests escalating to riots. The Seattle WTO protest in 1999
and the Ferguson police shooting protest in 2014, were examined side by side, in order to
discover commonalities in the course of events that may help to understand the escalation
of the two cases.
Design and Justification
The basic design of this study was a multiple case study with a constant
comparative method of grounded theory approach to analysis. A case study to investigate
this particular phenomena was used because, case studies are intended to answer how and
why questions when the participants and variables cannot be manipulated and when the
context is relevant to the phenomena (Baxter & Jack, 2008). In studying protests that
escalate to riots, while it may be possible to establish cooperation to implement an
experimental policing approach for example, it would not be possible to fully control the
variables. Not only would it be problematic to implement, but it would be unethical to
purposefully escalate a protest into a riot for the sake of a study. It is also important to
acknowledge the importance of context in protests. Every protest has an issue and a goal
to address, these aspects tend to be intrinsically tied to the people and place where the
protests occur.
The use of a multiple or comparative case study to approach this phenomena
worked to try to understand the similarities that occur in protests and protest policing that
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lead to escalation, even within differing contexts. A multiple case study predicts either
similar results, or contrasting results for predictable reasons (Baxter & Jack, 2008). In
this study, similar results have already been observed, that of a protest escalating to a riot,
so the use of the multiple case study will endeavor to understand how those similar
results came to be, or what can be determined to be the predictable reasons for this
outcome.
The approach used in this research is like that of an open ended question, it is not
encumbered by the goal of proving a hypothesis. This approach is used “to gain insight
and understanding of a particular situation or phenomena” (Baxter & Jack, 2008, p. 550).
While the study still utilized propositions, similar to hypotheses, to provide direction for
the study, a grounded theory approach allows for an openness to encountering findings
that may or may not align with those propositions. In essence. This approach provided the
opportunity to move away from predetermined biases and gain greater understanding of
the phenomena.
Data Collection and Analysis
The data for this study was collected and coded from secondary sources
recounting the two cases. Official federal and state governmental reports detailing the
events of the protest in Seattle and in Ferguson were examined and coded, by noting and
extracting, recurring and central themes. After the initial extracting of recurring themes,
these themes were re-evaluated to determine overlapping concepts, the codes were then
refined based on the second evaluation to determine what the most significant concepts
presented in the reports were. This coded data was then analyzed using the constant
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comparative method of grounded theory. This method aims to develop a conceptual
understanding of the issue based on the patterns that emerge from the data and building
on past related research. The focus in the research and analysis of the data generated, is to
better understand the phenomena, rather than to prove any existing theory, although this
approach still allows for that outcome.
Research Questions
This study seeks to understand how different police actions in protests can
escalate the event into a riot, what factors are present when this occurs, what are the
situations which necessitate that police make turning point choices, and what tools or
concepts can police apply to successfully navigate these situations in a community
focused nonviolent or non-confrontational way. The propositions which are guiding this
study, based on the literature include; escalation occurs when police and protesters do not
maintain continuous and open communication (Nassauer, 2015), escalation occurs when
the police have a poor relationship with the community and norms and standards differ
between them (Gillham & Marx, 2000, & Waddington & King, 2005), and escalation
occurs when police and protesters view each other as obstacles to their objectives
(Reicher et al., 2004). These propositions come from the theories developed in past
researcher and literature, which this study is building on and contributing to, they guide
this study in the sense that they are the preexisting perspectives regarding protest
escalation.
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Sampling
The two cases used in this study were chosen because of the similar traits and
scenarios they shared. In order to credibly compare cases they have to have
commonalities that can make the connections between them correlate. Meaning that, if
the cases differed too extensively it would be unclear what the contributing factors were
to the results. At the same time, these cases come from notably different contexts, which
this study anticipates contributing to the greater understanding of the phenomena. For
these two cases, both protests involved issues of government and moral values, both had
a component of police contribution or complicity in the issue, and both began with a
peaceful protest approach, which escalated into violence upon police intervention. Taking
into account the different contexts which center these similar scenarios, will illuminate
more vividly the commonalities which contributed to the escalation of the events. Other
reasons for selecting these two cases to study, was for the depth of reports on both events.
There are enough fact and incident based reports from respected government sources to
provide data from these cases for this study.
Limitations
The biggest limitation for this study is in regard to the number of cases analyzed.
This study only examined two cases for comparison, which can make it difficult to
extrapolate reliable correlation or causation. With more time and resources it would
strengthen the study to examine two or three more cases to corroborate the findings from
this study. Another limitation of this study was the lack of primary research to support
findings from the secondary sources. This is again due to a lack of time and resources.
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Many of the sources that would be relevant to interview are far away and difficult to
access on a timeline. However, this was not substantially detrimental to the study, as
many of the relevant sources have already been interviewed for the various reports
compiled on these cases. One more limitation, that may eventually be addressed, is lack
of review from police agencies and personnel. This study would be significantly
strengthened by feedback from personnel with experience in these types of events and
situations to comment on what the real time impact of the findings from this study might
be. However, this may be addressed in the future. If this study becomes of interest to
police agencies, they will at that time review the study with the reflective lens of real life
experience to augment and enrich the findings as they apply to their particular context.
Ethical Considerations
This study used only secondary sources and did not involve a human participant
component. All data collected and analyzed came from archival research of already
completed reports on the events. In this sense there is no ethical responsibility to
participants, as there are none. However, this study does hold relevance to current events
and subject matter that can be viewed as contentious. The ethical consideration to be
taken into account here has to do with how this study might be received by various
audiences. While it is impossible to cater to every person who happens to read this study,
it is important to acknowledge the varying perspectives of significance to this study.
Police face a lot of criticism, in a position where it is not always easy to find the best
solution, and protesters and communities struggle to make an impact against the entities
in power upheld by police agencies. This study attempts to acknowledge these
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perspectives and address the ethical considerations they embody, through a sincere
approach to increase understanding of how these groups can work more harmoniously
together.
Researcher Influence
Throughout my research I have made efforts to confront and challenge my
preconceived notions as they regard to policing and protest, this section is a means of
acknowledging my personal bias and the lens that I have brought to this research. My
initial interest in this subject emerged as I listened to a lecture about unrest in Northern
Ireland. The presenter, an expert in the conflict in Northern Ireland, described the picture
of protests and rioting as having remained virtually unchanged over the past 100 years. I
thought that seemed ridiculous and I couldn’t understand how no changes and
improvements in management had developed over all of those years. When I further
refined my topic to focus on protests in the United States, I discovered that theories for
improvement had been developed, but were not always successfully implemented. At this
point I had to take a step back to acknowledge, that unlike in the case of Northern
Ireland, I have personal investment in police practices in the United States, particularly as
a black woman. This presents an obvious conflict of interest as there is a long history in
the U.S. of unequal policing and prosecution of African Americans. For this reason, I
originally steered away from using Ferguson as one of my cases, in an effort to avoid this
conflict of interest. However, it was a good fit for the study, therefore, I made the
decision to simply remain constantly aware of biases which stem from my identity.
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The values I hold, which I believe show through in this research are largely based
around civil liberties. I strongly believe that police have a very challenging and complex
job, which requires nuanced and rapid decision making. I also believe that the primary
duty of police is to serve and protect, which inherently will take on different forms in
different scenarios, but part of that is protecting the rights of the people and communities
they serve. Based on the way police are portrayed when protests are poorly managed, I
undoubtedly expected to see blatant or rampant police misconduct. It was necessary to
reflect on that expectation and identify the impetus for that, including media
sensationalizing. Through this reflection, I chose to take a grounded theory approach
focusing on specific actions, rather than trying to interpret motivations. Through constant
reflection throughout this research, I was able to focus my findings and recommendations
around acknowledging the complexity of protest policing in particular, while promoting
an approach of respect for civil rights and liberties.
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Chapter 4
Findings

Four reports on police conduct in relation to the protests which escalated in
Seattle in 1999 and in Ferguson in 2014 were analyzed in order to identify commonalities
in practice that could explain or give an indication as to why or how these two protests
escalated in the way they did. For the WTO protest in Seattle, both the Seattle Police
Department After Action Report and the ACLU incident review were coded for emerging
themes. For the police shooting protest in Ferguson the federal level After Action
Assessment and the federal investigation of the Ferguson Police Department were coded
for emerging themes. These four reports each seemed to maintain their own individual
focus of concern and it was possible to identify clear turning points in both events, where
there was potential for the protest to plateau at a manageable level, or escalate. These
turning points are the main focus of this research, but the contributing and supporting
factors cited and noted in all of these reports are also important in understanding why
those turning points went in the direction they did, and how the escalation that occurred
from those points sustained further escalation throughout the events.
Through coding of these documents it became clear that the one of the strongest
concerns and motivators of police action in these two events was seeking to maintain or
reestablish order and control.
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Table 1
Key finding: Order and Control Focus
Case

Seattle

Ferguson

Prominent codes relating

- Violation of civil liberties

- Constitutional violations

to and indicating police

(11)

(38)

order and control focus

- Order/control (16)

- Order/control (14)

(frequency of appearance

- Misconduct (20)

- Use of canines (7)

in text)

- Lack of public safety

- Lack of public safety

focus (13)

focus (22)

- Use of force (22)

- Militarization (15)

The police are charged with maintaining and protecting public safety as well as
accommodating the rights of the public to protest and peaceably assemble (ACLU-Wa,
2000). Though maintaining order and control can sometimes help achieve a public safety
objective, the findings here indicate that order and control were frequently the main
objective, as it was often tied to tactics that escalated the situations, such as use of
chemical irritants like tear gas and pepper spray in the case of Seattle or canines and
militarization in the case of Ferguson. As the Seattle Police Department (2000) reported
that the “SPD and its mutual aid allies fought for control of the streets in the downtown
core and on nearby Capitol Hill. By December 2, order had been restored and there were
no further major disruptions” (p. 4). The ACLU-Wa (2000) described that the Seattle
Police Department used “tear gas, pepper spray, rubber bullets and clubs against people
who were demonstrating peaceably, against demonstrators who had not received or were
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trying to obey police orders, against bystanders, and to quell disturbances the police
themselves had provoked” (p. 8). In Ferguson the Institute for Intergovernmental
Research (2015) reported on the way “law enforcement staged armored vehicles visibly
in a way that was perceived as threatening to the community and, at times, used them
absent danger or peril to citizens or officers” (p. xvii).
Preparedness was another contributing factor which arose in the coding. It was
made evident that neither city’s police department was prepared for the size and intensity
of the protests they faced. A lot of the failures were cited as a result of this lack of
preparedness. Few officers involved in these events had had formal or extensive training
in massive demonstration policing, in multi-agency coordinated actions, or in handling of
constitutionally protected practices. One of the strongest themes regarding preparedness,
was that the event was much more expansive than expected.
Table 2
Key Finding: Lack of Preparedness
Case

Seattle

Ferguson

Prominent codes relating

- Inadequate

- Lack of training (9)

to and indicating lack of

planning/staffing (39)

- Poor strategy (10)

preparedness (frequency

- Lack of training (15)

- Internal communication

of appearance in text)

- Underestimation (6)

problems (14)

- Internal communication

- Arrest mismanagement

problems (10)

(10)
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The Seattle Police Department spent months preparing for the WTO conference
and the expected protests, but when the time came it was far beyond the scope anticipated
(Seattle Police Department, 2000). As a result the Seattle Police Department did not have
the staff and resources to manage the protests appropriately to the scale. This was
demonstrated by an inability to make the necessary arrests of various criminal
components within the greater peaceful protests. The SPD, instead, used chemical
irritants to control most components of the protest (ACLU-Wa, 2000 & SPD, 2000).
Specifically, the SPD (2000) noted that they “did not prepare detailed plans to address all
contingencies in sufficient depth” (p. 5) for example a special unit meant “to arrest and
remove extremists engaged in criminal acts… was re-deployed when the Tuesday
disturbances overwhelmed law enforcement and jeopardized the security of the
delegates” (p. 19).
Similar practice was seen in Ferguson in regards to lack of preparation and
resources to make appropriate arrests. The protests in Ferguson were not planned at all, as
they were in Seattle, so there were no months of preparation. The Ferguson Police
Department used their standard practices to manage the burgeoning protest at the site of
the Michael Brown’s shooting. It was never expected that the crowd on that afternoon
would grow into a city wide, multiple week long protest (IIR, 2015). As a result, the
response in Ferguson was not initially directed as protest policing. There was no initial
acknowledgment of constitutionally protected protest practices which would need
allowances made for it and therefore, the entire movement was met with efforts to
control. As a result, when the criminal component in Ferguson emerged, which granted
was greater than that in Seattle, Ferguson response resources were already stretched and
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unable to respond separately to criminal components. The IIR (2015) reported that “the
St. Louis County PD did not have enough resources, even with a code 1000 [request for
100 additional officers at a scene] at 8:25 p.m. and, immediately after, a code 2000
[increased request for additional officers] to control the level of violence and civil
disobedience that was occurring” (p. 14).
Communication also played an important role in creating and maintaining an
environment of escalation in these two events. As was suggested in the preceding
literature review, communication can be an essential component of successfully
managing a protest and creating an environment of community engagement that allows
for cooperation and understanding between police and protesters. This idea was
supported by the data collected in coding these documents. Most of the findings indicate
a complete lack of communication, or a lack of clear and sincere communication leading
into escalatory interventions. In instances of open and sincere communication there were
moments where potential for de-escalation were indicated.
Table 3
Key Findings: Lack of Communication
Case

Seattle

Ferguson

Prominent codes relating to - Communication with

- Communication with

and indicating lack of

public/protesters (17)

public/protesters (34)

communication

- Use of force (22)

- Community engagement

(frequency of appearance
in text)

(20)
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In the case of Seattle there were ample examples of communication efforts,
effective and not. The most frequent citing of communication was in the After Action
Report, in which the Seattle Police Department (2000) noted giving verbal orders and
warnings to protesters to disperse prior to any use of chemical irritants. Only once did the
report state providing 45 minutes for compliance with verbal orders before employing
chemical irritants. In every single other example, the report only indicates that a verbal
order and warning was given, with no indication of how much, if any, time was given for
compliance. The ACLU-Wa (2000) review indicated that on the occasions when verbal
orders and warnings were heard by protesters there was no time cushion given for
compliance before chemical irritants were employed as a method to force compliance.
This indicates ineffective use of communication, as the ACLU-Wa (2000) review also
indicated that protesters were frequently unable to hear these verbal orders. The ACLUWa (2000) recounted that “numerous witnesses reported… that police used clubs, gas
pepper spray and rubber bullets without giving orders to citizens. In some cases, orders
may have been rendered unintelligible because the speaker was wearing a gas mask” (pp.
50-51). The number of effective communication instances occurred as negotiations
between police and protesters. Multiple march routes were negotiated and enacted. One
particularly noteworthy instance of effective communication occurred when police were
protecting the Niketown store front from damage. Through communication with
protesters who did not want the situation to escalate to a point where their protest would
be forcibly dispersed, police gained the cooperation of many protesters in protecting the
store front (SPD, 2000).
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The situation in Ferguson was greatly hampered by lack of communication. The
historical community context lacked effective lines of communication, which followed
into the 2014 protests and impacted the event escalation (U.S. Department of Justice
Civil Rights Division, 2015). When the protest began there was a complete lack of
communication between the police investigating and the crowd that was gathering, which
was waiting for answers about what happened and was happening (IIR, 2015). There was
already a standard norm for low communication between police and community in
Ferguson, leading police not to consider any need for communicating and leaving the
community to develop their own theories about the situation (US DOJ Civil Rights
Division, 2015). The police continued toward their objective of order and control while
the community waited more and more restlessly for answers. This dynamic continued
throughout the extent of the protests (IIR, 2015). There was one instance emphasized
where there was a change in this dynamic, when command of police response changed
hands, and a new focus was brought to community engagement and communication (IIR,
2015).
While each of these components compound on the last, one common issue was
present that would have been liable to forestall the best preparations or strategies from
working effectively, the issue of poor internal communication. In both events there were
issues with the command centers communicating strategies, positions, and other cues
required for effective coordination between officers and agencies.
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Table 4
Key Findings: Internal Communication Problems
Case

Seattle

Ferguson

Prominent codes relating to - Internal communication

- Internal communication

and indicating problems

problems (10)

problems (10)

with internal

- Control coordination (8)

- Leadership

communication

inconsistencies (5)

(frequency of appearance
in text)

During the protests in Seattle, there were problems with the radio communication
system being overloaded with multiple aspects of the event management. The SPD
(2000) noted that not having a dedicated frequency for logistics, such as resupplying
equipment and coordinating food and breaks, caused noticeable and impactful losses in
logistic efficiency. There was also speculation that protest groups tapped into the police
radio frequency and were therefore able to avoid police maneuvers. The ACLU-Wa
(2000) indicated the confusion brought to protesters as a result of different units giving
contradicting orders, due to lack of internal communication and coordination between
units.
Much of the internal communication issues in the Ferguson case came from
confusion of leadership hierarchy. Multiple agencies were working together that did not
have experience working together in this type of context. The officers from various
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agencies prioritized direction from their own leadership and there was confusion initially
about which organization was the command lead (IIR, 2015). Eventually, the state
Governor stepped in and officially appointed Captain Ronald S. Johnson of the State
Highway Patrol as the incident commander. This new command improved efforts to
address many of the other issues contributing to the ongoing escalation of the protests in
Ferguson, however the internal communications issues were not rectified in a way that
allowed for full and coordinated implementation of the new strategies. Some of the
strategies were implemented, such as increased community engagement and
communication, specifically conducted by the Captain of the State Highway Patrol.
However, the progress achieved in implementation of this strategy was not sustained, as
other units and officers were not equally engaged with the new strategy (IIR, 2015).
There was speculation about these strategies being undermined by officers, as there were
indications that the community engagement of the incident commander was felt to be
unsupportive of officers, lowering officer morale (IIR, 2015). Regardless of the veracity
of that idea, any lowered morale and feelings of loss of support can be attributed to the
strong themes of poor internal communication.
Each of these issues played substantial roles in maintaining the escalation of these
two protests, as well as contributing to the scenarios which spurred the initial escalation.
Both of these protests had evident turning points where police made decisions about how
to proceed which negatively impacted the situation, by feeding tensions and not narrowly
addressing the public safety needs, in pursuance of order and control. In both events the
police actions taken at the turning points could be interpreted as demonstrations of
control and power in response to earlier mistakes in judgement or preparation.
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The major turning point in Seattle occurred at the start of the event when
protesters successfully blocked travel routes for WTO delegates and police had to retake
that ground (ACLU-Wa, 2000). The police were not prepared to effectively protect the
safe travel zones for delegates, as was one of their primary duties in providing security
for the WTO event. In order to follow through on that responsibility, extra officers were
deployed to assist in regaining control of the travel zones. Not only did this move draw in
officers away from other deployment areas, it set a precedent of police chasing protesters
out of the way of the WTO conference.
In terms of how this shift in deployment affected the turn of events, the SPD had
originally planned for special unit of officers to intercept criminal components within the
protest. As more and more officers were redeployed to help maintain control of
conference areas, that special unit became impossible to implement and the “SPD missed
a crucial opportunity to remove leadership of the unlawful disruptive element early on the
first day of the WTO” (SPD, 2000, p. 6). With the disruptive element still in play the
effort to maintain control of the conference area appeared more precarious. The immense
number of protesters in the area combined with the loose criminal element led the SPD to
move their controlled territory outward and brought on the initial use of chemical irritants
to force compliance (SPD, 2000). From the moment the SPD had to retake territory they
were playing a game of catch up, exerting their authority by holding onto and reaching
out for whatever control they could. From here, the other factors indicated above
continued to contribute to the ongoing escalation of the event.
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In Ferguson the turning point was also very near the beginning of the event. As
the crowd grew around site of Michael Brown’s shooting, the Ferguson Police
Department continued to increase their security around the site while the scene was being
investigated. The FPD maintained a focus on order to protect the crime scene and failed
to address the concerns of the gathering community. The lack of communication at this
point allowed the growing crowd to see a police presence growing in size and
aggressiveness, as canines were also brought to the scene (IIR, 2015). The police also
saw a crowd growing in size and hostility, as they heard the community’s anger without
understanding that the lack of communication was spurring it. Tensions continued to rise
between the growing police presence and the growing community presence, as neither
group engaged the other in clarifying dialogue. The police remained focused on
maintaining order to complete their task, which once complete, the FPD all cleared the
area, still never having clarified with the crowd any details of what had happened and
what was going on (IIR, 2015). From here the community was left to speculate about the
intentions and actions of the police throughout the afternoon. Based on the history of the
FPD and their relationship in this community, the speculation was negative and the
aggressiveness and lack of communication from their presence supported these negative
perceptions. As a result of the FPD’s aggressive showing and lack of communication the
tensions that grew during the crime scene investigation were never assuaged and the
observing crowd became a demonstration.
At the point when the FPD left the initial scene the crowd had escalated into a
demonstration. Although the demonstration was directly demanding answers and
accountability at this point, it was still in a peaceful demonstration stage, however, it was
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an unexpected result for the FPD and they were unprepared to address it. From this point
on, the factors indicated above continued to contribute to the mounting escalation of the
event. The FPD responded to the demonstration with the same showing of power as they
had at the initial scene and reconfirmed the perceptions that had helped to raise the
tensions at the onset. As the protest progressed through the days, another turning point
arose. With the implementation of the State Highway Patrol Captain as the incident
commander, new strategies were developed to deescalate the situation. Particularly
community engagement in communication. As the lack of this had allowed for growing
tensions, this was an attempt to reverse that. This tactic showed signs of effectiveness, as
the demonstrators were finally having their concerns heard and addressed. However, this
turning point failed to turn the situation back towards de-escalation as a result of poor
internal communication. The FPD chose to release information about the shooting,
specifically identifying Darren Wilson as the officer responsible, which was in line with
the new strategy, however, they simultaneously released video footage which indicated
that Michael Brown had been involved in a robbery prior to the shooting (IIR, 2015).
This action again escalated the event and undermined the community engagement
strategy that the new incident commander had tried to implement. As the IIR (2015)
explained “many community members believed the police were trying to take focus away
from Officer Wilson and place it on Mr. Brown. Some saw this as a police conspiracy
while others saw it as an attempt to justify the shooting. Rather than ease community
tensions, the announcement inflamed tensions and actions” (pp. 21-22).
The end of these two events came about through addressing many of the
deficiencies noted above. In Seattle, they received support from the Washington National
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Guard which create relief and room for maneuvering resources. With the added support
of the National Guard the SPD was able to intercept un-permitted demonstrations. This
allowed the SPD to reestablish space for police to communicate with protesters, drawing
back the lines on controlled territory and for protests to occur without any use of force to
maintain control (SPD, 2000). In Ferguson the community engagement strategy was
undermined, however, strategies to demilitarize the police presence relaxed the escalation
coming out of the struggle for power and control. This made it possible for the situation
to deescalate at the request of Michael Brown’s family in respect of his funeral (IIR,
2015).
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Chapter 5
Discussion
Protest and civil disobedience pose a considerable dilemma to police who have a
duty to protect the public, in terms of safety and security, as well as in exercising civil
liberties. In the context of protests these duties involve protecting public infrastructure,
business, and physical safety, as well as the constitutional rights to assemble and of free
speech. With even a simple cursory overview of the protests and demonstrations that
occur in the United States, it is evident that this is not an easy balance to reach. Through a
critical comparison of the cases of the Seattle 1999 protest and the Ferguson 2014 protest,
some recurring and prominent themes arose as playing important roles in losing this
precarious balance. The shortcomings that contribute to protest escalation, based on the
findings described in the previous chapter, appear to have a layering and compounding
effect stemming from a basic lack of preparation, which then led to and was exacerbated
by, poor communication, both internal and external, and a too narrow police focus on
order and control.
In relation to the research question, the findings tend to support the propositions,
although the factor of preparedness was not initially anticipated. The research question
sought to discover how different police actions in protests can escalate the event into a
riot, what factors are present when this occurs, what are the situations which necessitate
that police make turning point choices, and what tools or concepts can police apply to
successfully navigate these situations in a community focused nonviolent or nonconfrontational way. The propositions suggested that continuous open communication,
positive prior community relations, and a positive view of protesters and police would be
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beneficial to the successful navigation of protests. None of these propositions
encompasses preparedness, which was found to be a significant factor, however, that
preparedness influenced the other factors addressed in the propositions. Though prior
community relationship could positively impact some of the other themes and be tied into
preparedness as well as communication, it did not emerge as a strong theme in regards to
protest escalation. This suggests that these other factors, presented above, tend to
influence the course of protests more, at least in as far as they are examined as discrete
incidents, as opposed to ongoing daily community and police activity.
The preparation levels differed in the two cases examined, yet both were
inadequate in providing the response agencies with the tools and resources to properly
address these large scale protests. While Seattle made a concerted effort to prepare for
this event, they relied heavily on past local experiences with protests, which didn’t
involve inter-agency cooperation (SPD, 2000). The SPD understood the need to protect
the civil liberties of protesters, yet when the event occurred this became more difficult
than anticipated and the training and preparation they had established was not sufficient
to appropriately handle the mass of people and conflicting interests. The SPD worked
with neighboring police departments to enable the deployment of more officers to handle
the estimated size of the event, however joint training with these other agencies prior to
the event was limited. As a result they were unprepared for the challenges of
communication and coordination that would arise between the agencies. The SPD also
did not have extensive experience dealing with protests of this magnitude, nor in the
context of also providing security for an international level conference. The experience
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that the SPD was drawing from did not have the same level of conflicting interests as the
WTO protest, which aimed to shut down the WTO conference altogether.
The lack of preparation was most evident at the very start of the conference, when
the opening ceremony had to be canceled due to blockades of protesters. The protesters
physically blocked delegates from travelling from their hotels to the conference venue.
The SPD had not prepared a clear and protected route for the delegates and as a result had
to use force to clear the way for conference delegates to travel. The backtracking of the
SPD at this juncture illuminated how overall under-prepared they were and also
destabilized the preparation they did have. No longer could they have confidence in the
tactics of past experience. As a result, the standards of practice involving heavy deference
to civil liberties were abandoned as ineffective, in favor of methods of control that would
prioritize the conference interests.
In comparison to the preparation in Ferguson, Seattle was far ahead, yet the SPD
still seemed to reach similar dilemmas in regards to protecting protester civil liberties.
While the FPD was not forewarned of the upcoming protests, they also relied on a multiagency response to the protests. Just as in Seattle, these agencies had minimal training or
experience working together in a coordinated effort, much less in response to a protest of
this scale. On the same token, the FPD had much less experience with protests than
Seattle and therefore, did not start with the same premise of heavy deference to civil
liberties. This difference in starting points seems to not have made a substantial
difference, when considering how quickly Seattle abandoned that approach in favor of
control. The FPD began their interaction with the growing crowd using control oriented
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posturing, while Seattle took on that approach after losing ground during their initial
deferential approach. The FPD began the interaction with their standard approach to
policing, which emphasized order and police prominence, without awareness of the
mounting tensions that were boiling into protest. Without this prior knowledge, they were
not prepared to interact in any kind of specialized way to a protest situation, if they would
have intended to approach a protest differently at the outset.
From this initial lack of preparedness, simply in not knowing that the community
was on the verge of protest, the FPD had faced the same, and greater, lack of preparation
in training and experience for handling large scale protest and inter-agency response.
Once it was clear that the community had moved into protest, the FPD continued with
their standard response tactics, not having alternate plans for protest, aside from bringing
back-up from neighboring agencies. Though calling for support was an established
system, the agencies had not trained together to provide a coordinated response to
protests causing confusion in leadership and strategic objectives.
The police response in both of these protests retained a penchant toward control
and order that was influenced by the issues in preparation and cultivated the escalation of
the protests. Without the necessary training and preparation to handle these large scale
protests with effective tools and resources, the responders were inclined to resort to less
refined methods to accomplish less refined goals. In Seattle, the SPD chose to adjust their
focus in favor of the WTO conference interests and chose to address this objective by
essentially removing the protest from the area. This directly opposed the objective of the
protesters, who wished to have their message heard by the conference participants and
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therefore, pushed back against this police effort. The SPD claimed to be targeting the
destructive and violent component of the protest, however, they used broad sweeping
tactics which swept up peaceful protesters as well. The mass use of chemical irritants, as
well as shutting down to protesters, the downtown area surrounding the conference,
showed a prioritization of order to protecting civil liberties. The SPD continued to use
methods of control, pushing protesters further and further from the conference, without
making a clear delineation of where the protesters should go. While these control tactics
may have removed violent and destructive actors from the vulnerable area, it also swept
up the entirety of the peaceful protest component and even uninvolved civilians and
residents.
There was a comparatively larger violent destructive component to the protests in
Ferguson, and likewise the FPD response maintained an equivalently broadly sweeping
order and control approach to that seen in Seattle. Unlike in Seattle, where past police
experience preferred to show deference to civil liberties and constitutionally protected
activity, the FPD was shown to have a history of responding with additional efforts
towards control when encountering constitutionally protected activity (U.S. DOJ Civil
Rights Division, 2015). The FPD tended to view constitutionally protected behavior as
undermining of police authority, therefore the police response was to reassert authority
through control tactics. This was affirmed by how quickly canines and armored vehicles
made their appearance at the outset, as the protest had not yet actualized. These tactics
continued throughout the two weeks of the protest, maintaining the atmosphere of
escalation. This focus on control also contributed to preventing the strategic changes in
objective, which the new command attempted to implement, from working effectively.
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The new strategy was to take a community engagement and communication approach,
acknowledging the protest purpose and community goals. Part of this was sharing
information with the community about the shooting, specifically the name of the officer
involved. However, the strategic effort of the release of that information was undermined
by the assertion of control implied in the concurrent release of the robbery footage. This
sustained the escalated atmosphere. It wasn’t until the response withdrew the militarized
presence that the situation was able to deescalate.
As a component of the lack in preparation, was the ineffective internal
communication, which also contributed to the undermining of changing strategic
objectives, as well as any tactics which required coordinated efforts. This was particularly
evident in the case of Ferguson, as it was unclear to the participating agencies who was in
command, and how that command applied across the agencies. Again, this issue related
heavily to the lack of preparedness and training. As these agencies did not have extensive
experience working together, they were not familiar with command practices for an
incident of this magnitude. Eventually, Captain Johnson of the State Highway Patrol was
appointed as the official incident commander and the command lines were technically
clarified. However, without prior combined training to support the new authority and
without the experience to legitimize that authority to the responding officers and
agencies, his authority was mostly just a title. As a result, the new strategic efforts were
not understood and therefore viewed as undermining police authority on the ground.
While the command lines may have been clarified, the internal communication was not
improved, and the various agencies continued to be unable to work in effective strategic
coordination.
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The agencies in Seattle also struggled to effectively coordinate actions as a result
of poor internal communication. This can again be linked back to preparation, as the SPD
(2000) cited their over-saturated radio frequency as being a major contributor to their
issues with internal communication. The lack of internal communication resulted in
contradicting orders being given to protesters, creating a situation in which it was
impossible to comply with police demands, leading to further escalation. The problems
with internal communication also contributed to officer fatigue and stress, due to logistics
and supplying failures. This, compounded by a lack of relief resources, resulted in
officers working 15 hours without breaks to rest or eat (SPD, 2000). The amount of stress
and exhaustion these officers encountered is not conducive to maintaining fine-tuned
discretion and can be considered a contributing factor to the broad sweeping control and
order tactics employed.
While the preparedness, and internal communication issues paved the way for a
focus on order and control, the issues of external communication exacerbated the
reception of the police actions in these two cases. While the event in Seattle escalated due
to a turning point related to poor planning and preparation and efforts at recovery from
that, the sustained escalation was aggravated due to unclear communication with
protesters. Conversely, the turning point in Ferguson escalated from a complete lack of
communication with the community, which persisted along with the escalated
atmosphere.
In Seattle, the focus on order and control brought on aggressive use of chemical
irritants and other means of control, which escalated the situation, however, these police
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actions persisted with a perception of protester non-compliance. This non-compliance can
be linked to unclear communication. Protesters were not always provided audible or
consistent instructions from police, making it impossible to appropriately comply.
However, as the event in Seattle came to a close, the de-escalation seemed to be
facilitated by open and constructive communication.
In Ferguson, though it is unlikely that open and constructive communication
would have precluded the protests, it is likely that it would have greatly reduced the
intensity and extent of the protests. The findings showed that the lack of forthcoming
information from the FPD at the onset of the event increased tensions at the start, and
these tensions remained high as the sought after information continued to be withheld.
However, similarly to the Seattle case, when open and constructive communication
occurred it brought about a de-escalation, however short-lived. Furthermore, the protest
was brought to a tentative conclusion through communication facilitated by the incident
responders.
In respect to the turning points identified in these two cases, some conclusions can
be drawn about how police influence and respond to those situations in ways that can
either escalate or deescalate the situations. The turning points refer specifically to
moments in the events where actions, taken or not taken, moved the situation onto a
trajectory of continued escalation, particularly when possibly more calculated actions
could have moved the situation in the opposite direction. In the case of Seattle, the
turning point was clearly the result of inadequate preparation and an effort to regain
control. While in Ferguson the turning point was the result of lack of communication
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between police and the community and efforts to assert control. The common factor in
these to turning points are police efforts for control. In Seattle, the police lost control due
to inadequate preparation, but in Ferguson police maintained control, yet continually
escalated their presence and showing of control without openly communicating their
intent to the community it was impacting. This occurred a second time in Ferguson, when
police reasserted their position of control in their presentation of new information to the
community. These three turning points, in these two protests, suggest that police response
needs to be very cautious, precise, and intentional in their use of control tactics and the
objectives those tactics aim to achieve.
Preparation is the key to getting the other components right. Though, as was seen
in Seattle, even extensive preparation can be undermined by failures in other areas.
Nevertheless, preparation which addresses police to community communication needs
and procedures, internal communication protocols, standards, and hierarchies, and
provides ample training and resources for understanding refined application of control
tactics and the relationship of strategies and objectives, should prove to be considerably
impactful in deescalating those turning point situations.
The themes brought forth in the findings, and discussed here, had substantial
impact in these two cases. Preparation set the stage for everything that occurred
throughout both events, and influenced how police responded to the circumstances they
encountered in the protests. This included establishing, whether intentional or not, a focus
on order and control in the response efforts. Communication also played a vital role in the
playout of events. While communication between police and protesters was substantially
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important in deescalating events, internal communication also emerged as an important
factor. The internal communication aspect can be strongly tied to the preparedness factor,
as it is a part of the internal systems and protocols necessary in effectively coordinating a
large scale incident response. These themes emerged as substantial to these two cases, but
these findings are still limited.
The findings discussed in this section show the most significant themes
concerning the escalation of the protests in these two cases. While the themes discovered
were comparable and enlightening, they are only two cases. As this research stands,
though a relationship can be a seen, a true correlation cannot be established based on data
from these cases alone. This research should be extended further to examine more
protests, to corroborate the findings of this study and to determine what themes may have
been overlooked in these two cases. To delineate true best practices that can be shared
and disseminated to aid in protest policing, a more thorough understanding of protest
escalation should be established through extensive research of many cases. Currently
there are new cases arising in the United States as potential studies to be added to this
research. Adding any number of more cases to this study would serve to deepen the
understanding and strengthen the conclusions.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
Protest is an integral component of U.S. democracy that allows the public to voice
dissent, advocate for their beliefs, and hold those in power accountable. Protest is
therefore protected constitutionally in order that the government and other powerful
entities cannot silence people for bringing attention to concerns. This is seen as important
to maintaining a free democracy, the accountability protest seeks lies in giving the public
a fuller picture of what their choices mean, allowing the public to more fully vote their
conscience. Those in power therefore, have an interest in hearing out protest and
changing their behavior to more closely align with public values. This is the ideal of
protest in U.S. democracy.
The reality of protests in the United States is not as clean and smooth as
democratic ideals tend to depict it. While there is an expectation in American society to
have civil liberties such as freedom of speech and freedom of assembly protected, there is
also an expectation that communities be safe and the freedom of the public to go about
their daily business with safety and security is appreciated. The government is
responsible for providing public safety and security as well as protecting civil liberties. In
the context of protests, these government responsibilities can become entangled. Protests
aim to disrupt the everyday norms in order to draw public attention to their issue of
concern. This disruption is where problems start to arise.
The police agencies are the governmental bodies that bear the brunt of managing
the challenge of protests. Police are charged with protecting the public, safety and civil
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liberties alike. The challenge for police is how to protect both public safety and civil
liberties if one is in conflict with the other. This is not a simple task, as is demonstrated
by the frequency at which protests escalate into riots, or even seeming battles for control
of the streets. This outcome is favorable for neither police nor protesters. With this
outcome there is increased risk for all parties involved, risk of injury, and risk of damage
and destruction, as well as risk of violations of constitutional rights. Knowing the risks
and drawbacks illustrates the importance of properly managing protests to avoid these
negative outcomes.
As the above literature review showed, managing protests is not a new concern
and the strategies, tactics, and theories have changed over the years. There was a time
when protest crowds were not seen as rational people and instead treated as an unthinking
and easily manipulated mob. That perspective provided the groundwork for protests to be
treated with minimal discretion to civil liberties and protesters handled with force. Over
time this mob mentality perspective was determined to not accurately describe the way
people behave in crowds and in protests, and a new strategy of negotiated management
emerged, which focused on giving more deference to First Amendment rights. This new
approach was more passive and more careful in how and when force was used, to provide
a narrow approach tailored to protect civil liberties. Yet, even with this strategy, history
shows frequent examples of falling back on heavier control tactics notorious to the mob
mentality approach. Though there is plenty of research demonstrating the various ways
that police presence can influence the escalation of protests, and suggesting the types of
presence that should be the most effective in the successful management of a protest,
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cases continue to arise in which protests do escalate and the new strategies are
abandoned.
This research was designed to address the gap in the research between what type
of police presence and actions escalate protests and what behaviors lead to effective
successful protest policing, the gap where the problem and solution both seem to be
understood, yet there is a disconnect in practice. The examples of the incident in Seattle
in 1999 and the incident in Ferguson in 2014 were used to delve into an examination of
this gap. By examining two cases where protests escalated, this research focused on what
practices served to escalate or deescalate the situation and what was the moment that
precipitated the escalation or led to sustained escalation, as well as what occurred when
these two events eventually deescalated again.
The case in Seattle, WA in 1999 began as protests of the WTO conference
occurring over the course of a week in downtown Seattle. Many protesters were Seattle
residents, but the conference was of an international scale and likewise, protesters came
from all over to speak out against the policies that the WTO represent and support. The
city spent months planning the logistics of this conference and the SPD, in charge of
security, spent those months in planning as well. Unlike the prior WTO conference in
Geneva where security erected barriers of fencing, concrete, and even barbed wire, the
Seattle Police Department chose to essentially follow their usual approach to protest. The
SPD had the perspective of leniency to protest as their general experience was with
largely peaceful demonstrations and the SPD viewed the approach used in Geneva as
excessive, based on their past experience (SPD, 2000). When the conference began the
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protest was peaceful, but the numbers and organization of the protesters overwhelmed the
SPDs resources and caused the cancelation of the first event of the conference. From this
point the police began a different approach, in which they ordered and forced protesters
away from the immediate area of the conference, and continued to enforce this movement
away from downtown using chemical irritants and other less lethal force, over the course
of the next few days. This continued and prevented protests from addressing the WTO
directly until the National Guard arrived to support. Once the incident response was able
re-organize, they adjusted their approach to allow protests to address the conference
again.
The case in Ferguson, MO in 2014 began with the local community gathering at
the site of the fatal shooting by police of 18 year old African American Michael Brown.
As the day wore on, more members of the community arrived and the police presence
also increased with the addition of canines and armored vehicles. This continued until the
police were done investigating the scene, the body was removed, and the police departed.
The crowd of community members did not disperse and the tensions which had
accumulated with the police presence turned the crowd from vigil that night, into
protesters by the following day, seeking answers, explanations, and accountability over
the shooting. The protest moved in front of the police station and police presence again
mounted with the return of canines and armored vehicles. Tensions remained high and a
night of unrest began. From this point forward a pattern of protest during the day and
unrest at night occurred, with police maintaining a militarized presence to enforce order.
The incident response shifted slightly with the appointment of a new incident
commander, but it was not until over two weeks after the shooting that the unrest
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deescalated, with a decreased militarized police presence and a request from Michael
Brown’s Family.
The data for this study was collected and coded from secondary sources
recounting the two cases. Official federal and state governmental reports detailing the
events of the protest in Seattle and in Ferguson were examined and coded by noting and
extracting recurring and central themes. After the initial extracting of recurring themes,
these themes were re-evaluated to determine overlapping concepts, and the codes were
then refined based on the second evaluation to determine what the most significant
concepts presented in the reports were. This coded data was then analyzed using the
constant comparative method of grounded theory. This method aims to develop a
conceptual understanding of the issue based on the patterns that emerge from the data and
building on past related research.
The results of this research indicated that appropriate preparation plays a vital role
in how and what strategies are utilized in protest policing, including the nature of the
response to unexpected situations. This lack of preparation was continually stressed in the
After Action Report of the Seattle Police Department (2000). However, the amount of
time the SPD had to prepare, as well as information from previous WTO conferences
would make it seem that they should have been plenty prepared. This incongruity in time
and information available for preparation and the actual experience of preparation at the
time of the event, is cause for concern. One of the problems in the SPD preparation was
in regards to officer deployment. There were not sufficient personnel resources to relieve
officers in reasonable intervals and there were not sufficient personnel resources to make
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the narrow control choices necessary to prevent escalation. This can account for how and
why choices directed at broad sweeping control were made, but that still leaves questions
about how the SPD determined what size response they would need for the event.
Evidently, their conclusion was insufficient, but whether that was due to an
underestimation of the protest size, or to some other factor, such as budget, may or may
not be relevant.
With the realization of insufficient personnel resources, it should have been clear
that some strategies would have to change. What occurred was a shift from a strategy that
accommodated protest, to a strategy that pushed it continually outward. It is unclear if
this was truly a strategy in response to changing circumstances, or simply a reaction. This
is a question that brings preparation, as it pertains to training, to the forefront. Were the
officers deployed trained extensively enough to prepare them for changing and
unpredictable circumstances? With the dramatic shift in tactics, it seems that this may not
have been the case.
The situation in Ferguson brings the issue of training even more vividly to the
forefront. While the Ferguson Police Department had procedures in place for calling in
support from neighboring agencies, they had minimal field training on how this multiagency approach coordinated itself. This was evidenced by the need for the Governor to
step in and specifically appoint an incident commander. Further evidence came from the
fact that changes in strategy were either not fully communicated across agencies, or the
command was not trusted or respected enough to engage follow through on new
strategies. This is particularly concerning, because it indicates that even had the FPD
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good prior community relations, or communication, or preparation, any coordinated
efforts would be doomed to failure, due to lack of inter-organizational command
standards.
Also of critical concern in the case of Ferguson was the very poor relationship
between the police and the community. This negative relationship catalyzed the protest
and colored the police actions and interactions from the start. Unlike Seattle, where the
SPD had initially hoped to accommodate protests, there was never this perspective from
the FPD, nor was there this expectation from the community. This is a concern because, it
precludes a successful protest management simply due to lack of consideration for
protester rights, influenced by the fact that police do not have a relationship with the
community that they would wish to preserve and likewise the community does not have
confidence in police concern for their rights either.
Key findings
•

Police focused on order and control as a primary priority.

•

Police lacked sufficient preparedness for the scale of protest in terms of training
and efficient protocols.

•

Incident response lacked ongoing and open communication between police and
protesters.

•

Incident response lacked adequately functioning communication systems within
and across police agencies and units.
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Recommendations
1.

The first recommendation is that it should be ensured that every response
personnel understands the strategic objectives to the incident response. This is
the most basic and immediate frontline preparation and precaution that can be
made. If each officers understands the goals and strategies, they will
automatically be better equipped to make in the moment choices that align with
those strategic objectives.
This will by no means solve every problem, but it is entirely necessary if it is
hoped that officers make informed decisions. This recommendation will be of
value when there are breakdowns in internal communication and officers and
units have to make choices independently. This will also be of value when
officers encounter unexpected situations that may or may not have been covered
in prior trainings. With an understanding of the strategic objectives officers that
do not have a protocol set up can instead consider what actions, to their
knowledge, will best address the established strategic objectives.

2.

The second recommendation is extensive training in protection of civil liberties
and constitutional rights. This should include what exactly are protesters rights
and what responsibility do police have to protesters. This should also include
training on techniques and tactics for intercepting criminal elements without, or
only minimally, impeding the rights of surrounding protesters.
From this training, officers and agencies can develop an arsenal of tactics and the
strategic objectives to which they apply. With training of this nature, police
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agencies should be prepared for protest whether it is spontaneous, or they have
months of warning.
3.

The third and final recommendation is that neighboring police agencies should
periodically run joint simulations and exercises to provide experience with
working together in a coordinated way for large scale incidents. These exercises
should establish internal communication procedures, as well as standards for
determining command order, to prevent confusion in the event of an actual
combined incident response.
This process would not only give agencies experience working together and the
potential to coordinate in a more harmonized way, but it would also provide the
opportunity to share suggestions and best practices. These agencies would have
the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the concerns and practices of
various neighboring agencies and learn and problem solve together, based on
similar but different experiences. By developing inter-agency relationships in this
way, they would also establish understanding and trust leading to quicker support
responses in practice.

4.

Finally, a checklist form for police agency protest preparedness is included in
the appendix to aid agencies in identifying and establishing their preparation for
protest engagement.
These recommendations are designed to have a positive impact on the issues and

themes which emerged as the contributing factors which allowed for the escalation of the
protest in Seattle 1999 and Ferguson 2014. If these recommendations are applied in
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earnest they should be useful in protest policing, not just in retrospect, but going forward
to future protests as well. However, more studies should be done to strengthen this
research and recommendations.
Continued research will be imperative as protests are certain to continue
morphing and changing with the times and issues. This research compared two cases
which occurred 15 years apart and still found substantial applicable commonalities,
which reflected a variety of past research on protest policing. Therefore, it is likely that
this research will also remain applicable. By that same note however, it is telling that the
past research has in fact remained applicable, yet also remains largely unapplied. It seems
plausible that, more than further research to understand the right and wrong ways to
manage protests, concerted efforts should be made to provide resources and training to
apply these lessons learned and understandings developed, to more and more police
agencies. This research took a small step in trying to understand what occurs to prevent
the full and successful application of past research and while these recommendations are
intended to help with successful application, it does not address how to ensure that
agencies are getting this information, understanding it, and using it.
On the contrary, it is possible that none of this research is at all relevant or
applicable. Because all past research has required reflective and archival research as
opposed to experimental, it is not entirely possible to say, with much more than anecdotal
certainty, what the solution really is. In fact this research itself, though it establishes solid
themes from the cases, cannot truly identify how or if those protest could have been
managed successfully. Along the same lines, it is not at all unlikely that protests
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inherently escalate with police presence. Past research, this included, begin with the
premise that protests should not escalate, and it is an anomaly when they do. However,
perhaps the protests that flow without disruption or escalation are the actual anomaly.
The two cases analyzed in this research were in reference to protests with
political, governmental power implications, and were then managed by a branch of that
system of power. The WTO conference involved delegates from around the world
discussing trade deals and policies, the protests took issue with these policies and the
work of the WTO. In Ferguson the protest was directly related to police accountability, as
it related specifically to the fatal shooting of Michael Brown. As previously noted,
protests are meant to draw attention to issues of concern with the intent to inform and
change practices. The established power structures would naturally have opposing
interests.
This conflict of interest is what the First Amendment is designed to mitigate, but
that does not change the existence of the conflict. Police can train and prepare for protest
as extensively as they want and still, state and federal pressures, as well as internal
interests are bound to influence their approach. Even if the protest is not in direct relation
to police conduct or power, as was the case in Ferguson, protests by nature oppose the
police interest in protecting the status quo.
Research should be undertaken to investigate protester views of and relationship
to police, to determine if police intervention and involvement of any variety is, or can be
interpreted as nonthreatening. With the amount of research illustrating how escalation
occurs and suggesting best practices, it seems strange that escalation continues to occur at
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the frequency it does. Protests may be transforming in response to changing police
strategies to maintain the potential for escalation.
Furthermore, the use of these research findings and recommendations should be
explored in application to protests within other Western style democracies. Protest is a
global practice and this research can be applicable to societies which share similar values
regarding freedom of expression and respect for civil and human rights. With contextual
tailoring, this research can provide some foundation for police engagement with protests
in many Western style democracies. However, this research does not need to be limited to
societies with similar values to the United States. In places where the public is not
afforded the same type of civil rights, protests still occur, but with greater risk to the
participants. For development workers who seek to intervene as observers of human
rights or advocates for civil and human rights, this research can serve as a guide for the
types of actions that can support positive protest engagement.
This research has suggested that police lack of preparedness, focus on order and
control, and lack of suitable internal and external communication contribute to protest
escalation and that implementation of a few training and preparation strategies may be
effective in mitigating the potential for escalation at the critical moments. This research is
limited by the scope of cases examined as well as by the premise that protest should not
escalate. However, the recommendations above are given in sincerity to encourage the
continued efforts of police in addressing the challenging duty of policing protests.
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APPENDIX A
Checklist
Agency Protest Preparedness Checklist
Agency_________________________________________________________________
______
Incident
Commander_____________________________________________________________
Establish incident response partnerships with neighboring agencies
Partner agencies:
Contact person:
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
Conduct training exercises with above agencies
Establish internal communication protocol and back-up protocol
Prepare media statement guidelines
Prepare strategic objective guidelines and impress upon participating officers through
training exercises – including but not limited to:
• Protect life and property
• Protect civil rights, civil liberties, and privacy
• Respect human rights and dignity
• Carefully consider use of force
• Adhere to incident command strategy and tactics
• Communicate pertinent movement, deployment, and use of force to incident
command
Establish standards of communication with protesters on a unit level as differentiated
from media protocol
Establish resource allocation system and officer breaks and duty rotation
Other specific contextually based protocols:
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
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